What impact may 802.11w have on the efforts of rogue device containment with an overlay WIPS?

A.
802.11w introduces data integrity protection for some management and action frames, which may limits the methods used by WIPS to disconnect, and mitigate the impact of, rogue AP or client communications

B.
802.11w introduces new mechanisms by which unassociated clients canrefuseDeauthentication frames that can not be rejected by APs. This introduces new security concerns for WIPS containing Deauthentication attacks

C.
802.11 introduces a mechanism to Encrypt MAC headers in management and control frames, which have traditionally have been used by WIPS to detect network threats such as hijacking attacks and MAC spoofing

D.
802.11w inadvertently exposes new methods for attacks to exploit TKIP countermeasure using spoofed management frames of legitimate stations. WIPS solutions are in capable of preventing this type of attack

Explanation:
802.11w allows the receiving STA to refuse disassociation when management frame
protection (MFP) is negotiated and the message integrity check fails. Deauthentication frames can be sent by either an AP or a client station.

Deauthentication frames can be sent by either an AP or a client station. Deauthentication is a notifi cation, not a request. In the past, deauthentication could not be refused by the receiving station. 802.11w allows the receiving STA to refuse deauthentication when management frame protection is negotiated and the message integrity check fails. The 802.11w draft amendment defi nes arobust management frameas a management frame that can be protected by the management frame protection service.